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<title>Master's Program in International Affairs (MPIA) Capstones</title>
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<dc:date>2013-02-17T00:37:50Z</dc:date>
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<title>Applications to Homeland Security from the Katrina and Rita Hurricanes</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/97036</link>
<description>Applications to Homeland Security from the Katrina and Rita Hurricanes
Gaps of understanding exist between Homeland Security Response and Recovery strategies and policies at the federal level versus understanding, authority, and capability at the state and local level. Responsibilities, authority, and expectations at every level of government (including the public) need to be clarified. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita provide an excellent case study to see what policies should be changed in the areas of response and recovery to major disasters in the future.; A variety of strategies, policies, and plans are already in place to deal with disasters and catastrophic events. Faculty members provided access to documents that describe the policies, as well as a framework to examine response and recovery "at the tip of the spear." Students selected the aspect of the framework they wished to address, fleshed it out in detail through discussions and research, identified the gaps in theory, used Hurricanes Katrina and/or Rita to examine how those gaps developed in reality, and developed a set of policy recommendations to close those gaps. The final student recommendations were presented to the clients.
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<dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<title>Analysis of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/97037</link>
<description>Analysis of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) was established in 1956 to provide the President with a nonpartisan evaluation of the role and effectiveness of U.S. intelligence collection, counterintelligence, covert action operations, and intelligence analysis. Over the years, PFIAB has evolved to reflect the needs of the times and in response to the style of each president. In addition, the government has created new centers and other organizations leading to competing views and the bureaucratic challenge of coordination and oversight of intelligence.; No detailed analysis of PFIAB had been conducted. In the wake of the 9/11 tragedy and the new intelligence reform environment, it was essential to examine the role of the PFIAB in the past to determine how it best can serve future presidents' national security decision-making responsibilities. The aim of the analysis was to determine what had been the strengths and weaknesses of the PFIAB in the past and to identify a productive role for the PFIAB in this new environment. Given the current intelligence needs of the country, such an examination was essential. It helped further define the role of PFIAB and shed light on the interrelationship of various intelligence components. Most importantly, it provided recommendations for presidential action to redefine, and possibly augment, the role of the PFIAB.
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<dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<title>Finance for Low Income Communities: Possible Applications of US Experience for India</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/97038</link>
<description>Finance for Low Income Communities: Possible Applications of US Experience for India
Much of the world's poor has difficulty in obtaining loans, especially the small loans (termed microfinance) they require. In order to improve access, Mohammed Yunus founded the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, which uses innovative methods so the poor can obtain loans. The lessons of the Grameen Bank have been replicated worldwide, including in India in 2004 with Grameen Capital India (GCI). GCI partners with commercial banks such as the largest Indian private bank, ICICI bank, and Citigroup in order to provide funds to microfinance institutions. It structures its financial products so that low-income producers can access capital markets through various initiatives. GCI wants to expand this effort because only 5 % of Indian microfinance demand is now being met but is concerned that expanding is difficult. They believe they can learn much from an organization that has successfully increased its scale.; A parallel organization in the U.S. is the Community Reinvestment Fund (CRF, crfusa.com). The CRF provides economic development funds and acts as a secondary market for loans for affordable housing and community facilities. Founded in 1989, with lending institutions in 22 states, the CRF has more experience than GCI in expanding operations. Students in this capstone project interacted with members from both the CRF and GCI and applied the lessons of the CRF to the GCI. They provided valuable advice to GCI on how it can enhance financial assistance for very small entrepreneurs in India, especially housing finance.; In this endeavor, students became familiar with one of the most popular of development fields. They actively engaged in current discussions on financial development in India and enhanced their own analytical skills in the fields of economics and finance.
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<dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<title>Command and Control in the Iraqi Insurgency</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/97035</link>
<description>Command and Control in the Iraqi Insurgency
The Iraqi insurgency was formed by multiple nationalities and ethnicities with disparate goals and motivations. A central question to understanding the insurgency's unity is whether there is command and control, which is defined as the sharing of tactics, information, and skills. This capstone explored this question by investigating how insurgent groups in the past have managed to communicate and disseminate tactics, even while operating in a dangerous environment controlled by their more powerful adversary. The class then applied this historical lesson to the current situation in Iraq and examined whether the history of attacks indicated command and control in the Iraqi insurgency.
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<dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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